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DUE PROCESS IN VALUATION OF LOCAL UTILITIES
By FREDERICK K. BEUTEL*
Argumnentum ab mconvenwnti plurnum valet tn tege. Non saotum quad Ucet
zed quid estconve nsna et considerandu,. Niz il quod cst inconventmlt. eat 1iium.l

I

THE INTERESTS AND THEORIES INVOLVED IN RATE MAKING

OUR anxiety to pursue logic to its bitter end, and to
reduce all law to rules that can be ascertained with mechanical
certainty, we are often prone to overlook the great jurist's suggestion that one of the purposes of the law is human convenience.
After all, the primary justification of any rule is what it accomplishes to solve a concrete social problem. Its logic and reason
N

are important, but must ultimately give way to the pragmatic
test of success or failure of the law in operation.

Volumes of discussion have been written on the economic
side of the question of public utility rate regulation, and scarcely
less volurnous are the articles, books, and decisions devoted to
the legal theory of "rate making." And perhaps it is because
learned lawyers, economists and engineers have argued and disagreed upon almost every conceivable phase of the theory, that
the practice of rate making still remains unsettled in its most
important phase, "valuation for rate making purposes."
It is not the desire of the writer to add to, or attempt a reconciliation of the theories already advanced. If any contribution
is to be made at this time, it lies in an examination and evaluation
*Professor of Law, Tulane University, New Orleans, La.
'Coke upon Littleton, sec. 87, 66a. "The argument from inconvenience is of greatest strength in the law- for not only what is permissible but what is convenient is to be taken into consideration.
Nothing that is inconvenient is permissible." For other examples of
the force of the argument from inconvenience see id.. sec. 138, 97a,
sec. 231, 152b, sec. 269, 178a, sec. 440, 261b, sec. 478, 279a, sec. 665, 351b,

sec. 772, 379a, sec. 732, 383a; see also Broom, Legal Maxims 127-129
and cases there cited.
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of the results which are being achieved in the actual practice of
rate regulation. This paper turns its attention entirely to one
phase of the whole problem, the methods followed and the practical
results obtained by the federal courts in dealing with the question
of valuation.2
Before examining the procedure and questions of law raised
in these cases, it is necessary to review briefly the interests in
rate making cases and the general economic theories upon which
prices of public utility goods might be determined.
The usual parties to public utility rate cases before the courts
are the utility corporation on one side, and a representative of the
regulatory body on the other.' But it is a well known fact that
both of the nominal parties are merely convenient legal fictions
to designate, or camouflage, the real human interests involved.
The corporation stands in a direct representative capacity for the
investors, and indirectly for the executives and the workers in the
industry The commission represents a still more complex body
of interests, those of the actual consumers or purchasers of the
utility service, and those of the state or the general public.
The ends which the corporations ultimately desire to realize
are a maximum of financial return, and the fullest possible freedom of action in the conduct of the industry These interests
stated concretely are a high rate of return on the investment, a
freedom to make innovations in service, and a guarantee of security against losses. The consumers, on the other hand, are
interested in a maximum of utility in exchange for a minimum of
inconvenience that is. in continuous service, improvement of
methods and product, and lowest possible rates. The state, or
public at large, desires a maximum of production and a normal
industrial advancement consistent with the progress of a changing
social order, concretely, a maximum of continually improving
service, at rates which equitably distribute the economic benefit
of the industry to both producer and consumer, achieved with
the least outlay of money and time spent in supervision by the
commission and review by the courts. All are interested in a
2For a discussion of state cases on this problem see Whitten &
Wilcox, Valuation of Public Service Corporations, ch. VII, VIII, X,
and XIII.
3lt is not unusual to find many other parties to the suit before the
public service commission. As an example of this see McCardle v.
Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U. S., record p. 10, where the city of
Indianapolis, the Chamber of Commerce, the Central Labor Unions,
and fifteen civic organizations appeared before the commission.
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speedy trial and a reasonable predictability of the result, "in order
that there may be a government of law and not of men."
Theories of rate making will be found to differ to the extent
that their advocates represent one or the other of these points of
view. The rates of the unregulated corporation will be determined only upon the principle of what the traffic will bear. That
is, the enlightened directors will set their rates at a point which
will immediately, or in the long run, yield the largest net return
to the company I
The consumers, on the other hand, will insist that rates be
set at a point which will yield them a maximum of service at the
greatest economic profit to themselves. Skillfully applied this
theory would result in efficient service at cost or less.'
The public interest will demand a rate which yields the
maximum of social wealth in the form of useful production. This
would result in the so-called competitive compromise, or economic
theory of rate making.6
It should be noted that in each of these theories the cost of
production is a secondary consideration. The corporation has its
eye on gross return and clear profit, the consumer on maximum
service at minimum cost to himself, and the public welfare demands
the production of social wealth and happiness.7 The cost of
4

Their success in this effort to get the largest financial return
from the consuming public will depend upon many factors, the most
important of which are: the existence of monopoly conditions and the
ability of the executives to estimate the demand for the service at
various levels of prices, and the ease with which prices and types of
service may be changed without disrupting business conditions. See
Spurr, Guiding Principles of Public Service Regulation, ch. X, Barker,
Utility Rates 11, Nash, Economics of Public Utilities 242.
Public
5
Some of the factors affecting the consumers' ability to get such
rates will be the existence of competition, the ratio of the combined
bargaining power of the purchasers to that of the company, or the
consumers' power to fix rates either through co~perative production,
public ownership, or intelligent commissions with heavy leanings toward the consumers' interests. For an attempt to approach this theory
from6 the cost side see.Barker, Public Utility Rates, ch. IV
Under this theory, rates are set at a point which they would
reach in a free market under the existence of normal or theoretical
competition, or at a point which would secure maximum production
consistent with an equitable division of the profits of the industry
between the producer and consumer. Cabot, Address Before Amencan Gas Association, October, 1926.
7Some economists, usually those representing the companies. have
argued that in the long run all these interests will prove to be identical: and that the only function of the commission is to set the rates
at this optimum point which will give the maximum of return to each.
However this may be in theory, it is certain that no case has yet
arisen where the various parties to the litigation could be persuaded
that their interests were identical in every respct.
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service s is only one of the items to be considered in rate making,
and its only function is to set a limit of gross return below which
rates cannot long remain if the industry is to be conducted by
unaided private capital. 9 Thus it is possible to have effective rate
regulation without placing much emphasis on the cost of service,
with its accompanying problem of valuation. 1
II

RATE MAKING PRACTICE, THE FEDERAL QUESTION

Rate making in practice has not followed consistently any
theory In the early stages of the growth of public utilities in this
country the rates were fixed by competition, if it existed, by
contract between the company and the community served, by
charters and franchises, by legislative fiat, or by the companies
themselves. 11 As each utility rapidly developed into a monopoly
in its field," each followed as best it could a course which
approached the theory of charging what the traffic would bear.
In this situation the only limits on the companies' ability to get
a maximum return were the franchise and other contracts which
they had made with governmental bodies, the legal requirement of
a "reasonable rate" or "reasonable return," the growing fear of
public ownership, 3 or compulsory rate fixing.
80f course it is impossible even with the best cost accounting
methods to determine exactly the cost of any particular service within
the field covered by the business, as, for example, the cost of carrying a passenger on a railroad handling both freight and passengers.
Thus particular rates are never set on a cost basis; but rather in
relation to their contribution to the total income. For the accounting
problems involved see Nash, Economics of Public Utilities, ch. IX.
9
Many public utilities are operated on a basis of contribution to
cost of service by the public. These contributions may take the form
of subsidies, land grants, private ownership and state operation, state
ownership and private operation, or both governmental ownership
and operation.
For a summary of the development of government
ownership see Glaeser, Outlines of Public Utility Economics 677 ff
Nash, Economics of Public Utilities, ch. XIV
0
1 The policy of valuation as a basis of rate making has been
criticized in England, see L. R. A. 1916F 600. For the English method
see Glaeser, Outlines of Public Utility Economics 299-304, and C. S.
Morgan, Regulation and Management of Public Utilities 157 ft.
1
" For a detailed discussion of this development see Glaeser, Outlines of Public Utility Economics, ch. IX, X, XII.
i2Effective competition over the whole field of rates now is re
moved almost entirely.
If it exists at all today it is only at the
fringes of the business, where the service is similar to that rendered
by other companies, as, for example, the competition between gas

and coal for heating, or electricity and gas for lighting purposes.
13On the extent and success of public ownership see Nash, Economics of Public Utilities, ch. XIV Thompson, Public Ownership of
Public Utilities; National Electric Light Ass'n, Political Ownership
and the Electric Industry.
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The rise of public service

commissions, with

increasing

attempts to establish a reasonable return, soon resulted in legis1
lation empowering the commission to fix and change rates. '
Due to the fact that each commission has a history of its own
and operates under special legislation, it is impossible to go into
even a summary of the development of rate fixing before the
commissions. 15 It is sufficient for our purposes to say that no
18
uniform theory of rate making has been adopted. Although there
has been a great deal of talk about the "cost of service" theory
of rate fixing, there never has been a successful attempt to apply
it,' because, as we shall see, no scientific or effective method of
determining valuation has yet been devised.
In actual practice, rates of local public utilities are still made
occasionally by the company itself, by charters or other agreements between the company and representatives of municipal corporations or governmental units, by local city ordinances or by statute.
But rate fixing involving action by some type of state public service
The
commission rapidly is becorming the normal practice.
statutes and procedures differ as to the means by which the commission obtains jurisdiction to pass upon rates. In some cases
the company may initiate the change by submitting a new rate
schedule, in others a private citizen or public official may raise
the question, and sometimes the commission starts the action on
its own motion. These different means may be optional or prescribed by law; but eventually the commission hears the case on its
merits and fixes a rate.
Appeal to the state courts from the findings of the commission on the reasonableness or legality of the rates so fixed may
usually be had by any of the parties. The forms of these actions
are of little importance for our purposes except that they are
similar to suits in equity and involve some form of setting the
rate aside or enjoining the commission from enforcing it.
However, the procedure by which these cases get into the
federal courts is of extreme importance to the subject at hand.
14This power has existed in some states since 1885, and a general
extension to local utilities began shortly after 1900. See Glaeser,
Outlines of Public Utility Economics 223-235.
1sFor such a history of this development see Glaeser, Outlines
of Public Utility Economics, ch. XI, XIV and XV
16For a discussion of the various methods of fixing rates see
Whitten & Wilcox, and Glaeser, Outlines of Public Utility Economics
and also Bauer, Effective Regulation of Public Utilities.
17See Bauer, Effective Regulation of Public Utilities 43 ff, and
Glaeser, Outlines of Public Utility Economics, ch. XXVII.
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With the exception of suits involving diversity of citizenship,
which are too rare to be of any importance, there are only two
ways by which these cases get into the federal courts .28 by writ
of error from the supreme court of the state in which the utility
is located,1" or by an original suit brought in the lower federal
20
courts to enjoin directly the enforcement of the rate.
forms of procedure the question of law is the same.

In both
It arises

under the fourteenth amendment to the constitution, i.e., is the
return to the company on the rate so fixed so low as to constitute
taking of its property without due process of law?
It is fundamental to an understanding of these cases to note
21
that the federal courts are not fixing the rates to be charged.
Neither are they passing upon the question of whether or not the
commission followed

the proper procedure

methods in fixing the rates.2 2
8

or used prescribed

The sole question of law is

does

1 We are dealing here only with cases involving rates of local
public utilities coming up under state laws. Those under the Interstate Commerce Act and the local statutes for the District of Columbia
are not considered except where similar questions are raised.
19For examples of this sort of case see Bluefields Water Works
Co. v. Public Service Commission, (1922) 262 U. S. 679, 43 Sup. Ct.
675, 67 L. Ed. 1176; Ohio Utilities Co. v. Public Utilities Commission
of Ohio, (1924) 267 U. S. 359, 45 Sup. Ct. 259, 69 L. Ed. 656; Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Commission, (1922) 262 U. S.
276, 2043 Sup. Ct. 544, 67 L. Ed. 981.
For examples of this procedure see Georgia Ry and Power
Co. v. Railway Commission of Georgia, (1922) 262 U. S. 625, 43 Sup.
Ct. 680, 67 L. Ed. 1144, Minnesota Rate Case, (1912) 230 U. S. 352,
33 Sup. Ct. 729- 57 L. Ed. 1511 Galveston Electric Co. v. Galveston,
(1921) 258 U. S. 388, 42 Sup. Ct. 351, 66 L. Ed. 678, Pacific Gas and
Electric Co. v. San Francisco, (1923) 265 U S. 403, 44 Sup. Ct. 537
68 L. Ed. 1075, McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., (1926) 272 U
S. 400, 47 Sup. Ct. 144, 71 L. Ed. 316; and the Consolidated Gas Co.
Cases2 1 cited in note 87 below.
Honolulu v. Hawaii, (1908) 211 U. S. 282, 29 Sup. Ct. 55, 53
L. Ed. 186; Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., (1921) 258 U. S. 165,
177 42 Sup. Ct. 264, 66 L. Ed. 538, Keller v. Potomac Electric Power
Co., 2(1922)
261 U. S. 428, 43 Sup. Ct. 445, 67 L. Ed. 731.
2
The procedure before the commission is governed by state statute, and cannot be a federal question except in so far as it raises the
question of arbitrary action under the constitutional requirements of
due process of law. The Supreme Court has even gone so far as to
refuse to tamper with methods used by the Interstate Commerce
Commission.
St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Interstate Coiimerce Commission, (1923) 264 U. S. 64, 44 Sup. Ct. 294, 68 L. Ed.
565; Delaware & Hudson Co. v United States, (1924) 266 U S.
438, 45 Sup. Ct. 153, 69 L. Ed. 369- United States v. Interstate Coinmission (C.A. D.C. 1925) 6 F (2d) 692, certiorari denied, (1925)
269 U. S. 570, 46 Sup. Ct. 26, 70 L. Ed. 417 New York, 0. & W Ry
v. United States, (D.C. N.Y 1926) 14 F (2d) 850, affirmed without
opinion, (1927) 273 U. S. 652, 47 Sup. Ct. 334, 71 L. Ed. 823" United
States v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. R., (1927) 273 U. S. 299, 47
Sup. Ct. 431, 71 L. Ed. 446.
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this rate as fixed by the commission yield a financial return
which is so unreasonably low as to constitute confiscation? This
constitutional measure of confiscation is too well settled to admit
of any question of doubt. Stated in the language of the courts
the law is this, "There must be a fair return upon the reasonable
2 3value of the property" being used for the public.
III

MEANING OF "RETURN"

AND "VALUE OF PROPERTY"

It is apparent that this rule requires an explanation of the
meaning of the expressions "return" and "value of the property "
Although
Let us examine first the meaning of "return."
considerable confusion is introduced into the whole subject due
to the fact that lawyers, economists, accountants and engineers do
not have a uniform meaning for the same terms used in discussing
valuation, it is clear that "rate of return" must be distinguished
from "rates" fixed by the commission. The rates are the price
which the consumer pays for a unit of service, while the return is
the residue left to the company after the cost of production is
subtracted from the gross proceeds of the sale of the service
to all customers. Thus it is possible that a decrease in rates might
yield an increased return, or an increase in rates might yield
a smaller return, due to changes in volume of consumption resulting from changes in price. But in any event, the return is
a matter of fact which must be determined by accounting and
N 2 economics, and not by any artificial rules of law.
Omitting accounting technicalities and overlooking innumerable minor problems of economics and finance, the return may
be said to be made up of the following factors
-"There must be a fair return upon the reasonable value of the
the value of
property at the time it is being used for the public
the property is to be determined as of the time when the inquiry is
made regarding rates." Missouri ex rel. S. W Bell Tel. Co. v. Public
Service Commission, (1922) 262 U. S. 276, 287 43 Sup. Ct. 544, 67
L. Ed. 981. See also Wilcox v. Consolidated Co., (1908) 212 U. S.
19, 41, 52, 29 Sup. Ct. 192, 53 L. Ed. 382; San Diego Land and Town
Co. v. National City, (1899) 174 U. S. 739, 757 19 Sup. Ct. 804, 43
L. Ed. 1154; Minnesota Rate Case, (1912) 230 U. S. 352, 454, 33 Sup.
Ct. 729, 57 L. Ed. 1511, Denver v. Denver Union Water Co., (1917)
246 U. S. 178, 191, 38 Sup. Ct. 278, 62 L. Ed. 649" Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., (1921) 258 U. S. 165, 42 Sup. Ct. 264, 66 L. Ed.
538; Galveston Electric Co. v. Galveston, (1921) 259 U. S. 388, 42
Sup. Ct. 351, 66 L. Ed. 678; Bluefields Co. v. Public Service Comnission, (1922) 262 U. S. 679, 690, 43 Sup. Ct. 675, 67 L. Ed. 1176, and
Georgia Ry. and Power Co. v. Railroad Commission, (1922) 262 U. S.
625, 24
631, 43 Sup. Ct. 680, 67 L. E. 1144.
For the cases on the points and discussions of the law involved
see notes, L. R. A. 1915A 5; and 52 L. R. A. (N.S.) 15.
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(1)

Gross income from all services

(2)
(3)

Total operating expenses
Total overhead costs including
(a) Interest on borrowed capital
(b) Executive supervision, etc.
Proper allowances for depreciation

Less

(4)
Remainder
(5)
Return
The determination of items (1), (2) and (3) would appear to be
a simple problem of accounting and to offer little difficulty If
the rates have been in effect for some time before the litigation is
started, the question is simply one of weighing and evaluating
amounts to be subtracted from a known gross income. But if the
rates in question have never been collected, the tribunal is faced
with the task of projecting the effect upon the market of the
change in rates, with its resulting increase or decrease of operating
expenses, overhead costs and gross income, which in turn reflects
an increased or decreased return. Thus the cases involving the
constitutionality of a new rate enter at once into a fog of speculation and expert opinion, upon even the most elemental phases
of the problem, which no court passing upon the facts can ever
hope to escape.

25

Regardless of whether the rate is established or new, the
problem of determining item (4), proper deduction from the income as allowance for depreciation, is a difficult one. It involves
estimating a future wear and tear on machinery and losses due
to unforeseeable obsolescence. At least five approved methods of
determining this one item to be subtracted from gross income to
establish return have been evolved. 20 No two of the systems
25

In practice the courts often overlook the necessity of making
this adjustment, and erroneously project the new return on the basis
of the old volume of business. This of course never corresponds to the
actual facts. For an example of this sort of calculation see Consolidated
26 Gas Co. v. City of New York, (C.C.N.Y. 1907) 157 Fed. 849, 869.
"Several different methods are used for measuring depreciation:
(1) The replacement method; (2) The straight-line method; (3) The
compound interest method; (4) The sinking fund method; (5) The
unit cost method. It is largely a matter of judgment whether, and to
what extent, any one of these several methods of depreciation should
be applied. They may give widely different results. Special Report.
October 28, 1916, Valuation of Public Utilities, American Society of
Civil Engineers, Vol. 42 Proceedings, pp. 1723-1727 1846-1900."
Note, Mr. Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion, Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Commission, (1922) 262 U. S.
276, 294, 43 Sup. Ct. 544, 67 L. Ed. 981.
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can be reconciled in theory or result. Each has its particular
purpose, and economists and engineers will differ widely in
choosing the rule to be applied to any particular case. So it is not
surprising that whenever law courts have been faced with the
task of deterrmning this amount, they have either dodged the
issue or floundered hopelessly in a mire of conflicting expert
27

opimon.

After the tribunal has determined this comparatively elementary fact of return, the second and more difficult problem of
determining value still remains. The rule of law requires a
"fair return upon the reasonablevalue of the property."
Disregarding for the moment the question of fairness of the
return,2 8 let us see how the value of the property is to be determined. Here again the law is clear- "The value of the property
is to be deterrmned as of the time when the inquiry is made regarding rates."2- Once more we are faced with a mere question
of fact; but the determination of that fact is one of the knottiest
problems that has commanded the attention of modern courts.
Value for any purpose is one of the most disputed theories of the
economists, and even writers of elementary texts disagree as to the
meaning and application of the term to the simplest of problems ."
It is no wonder, then, that there is difficulty in determining the
value of so complicated a unit as a public utility."
The property included in such a valuation of a complete
operating concern has been classified as follows 3 2
27

For cases dealing with depreciation see notes, 38 L. R. A. (N.S.)

1209; L. R. A. 1916F 761. For judicial differences on the subject see
Pacific Gas Co. v. San Francisco, (1923) 265 U. S.403, 406, 424, 44 Sup.
Ct. 537, 68 L. Ed. 1075, where the master, Mr. Justice McReynolds and
Mr. Justice Brandeis all disagreed as to the proper method of charging
depreciation.
28
For a discussion of the economic question involved in fairness of
return see Glaeser, Outlines of Public Utility Economics, ch. XIX,
Nash, Economics of Public Utilities, ch. IX.
29See cases cited in note 23 above.
"OFor examples of this divergence of opinion among economists
see: Davenport, Economics of Enterprise 24; Taussig, Principles of
Economics 11 if; Fairchild, Elementary Economics 22; Garver, Elementary Economics 197, summary there given.
3lAs early as 1920 it was pointed out that "fair value" wvas a
"myth" to conceal a process of arbitrary decisions based upon considerations of policy. Henderson, Railway Valuation and the Courts, 33
Harv.2 Law Rev. 902 and 1031, 1055.
3 Note to Mr. Justice Brandeis' opinion in Southwestern Bell Case,
(1922) 262 U. S. 276, 293, 43 Sup. Ct. 544, 67 L. Ed. 981, citing Report
of Special Committee on Valuation, American Society of Civil Engineers, October 28, 1916, 42 Proceedings, pp. 1708-1938.
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A.

B.

C.

Tangibles
1. Land and Buildings
2. Plant
Incidentals dunng construction
1. Administration
2. Engineering and superintendence
3. Legal expense
4. Brokerage
5. Promotion fees
6. Insurance
7 Taxes
8. Bond discount
9 Contingencies
Intangibles
1. Good will
2. Franchise value
3. Going concern value
4. Working capital.
IV

THEORIES OF VALUATION

It would be impossible to discuss here in detail all of the
various theories and methods which have been advanced to
determine the present value of these items for "rate making
purposes." 33 But to illustrate the complicated nature of the problem, it will be useful to examine briefly the question of the valuation of the tangible property (item A above) A few of the independent and irreconcilable theories which have been offered in
evidence as a measure of the present value of this property all
of which have received judicial approval, are set out below
1. The market price34 of the property either (a) as a going
concern or (b) as scrap, i.e., its sales price for other uses. This
3SValue for other purposes is not even considered here; but it is
not at all unusual in practice to find a utility with different values for
different purposes such as taxation, capitalization, incorporatioi and
stock sales, bond issues, etc. For an example of this needless coipounding of valuations see Whitten & Wilcox, Valuation of Public
Service Corporation ch. IV Bonbright, Problem of Judicial Valuation,
27 Col.
L. Rev. 493.
5
4For an example of the use of market price as a measure of valuation see Mr. Hagenah's testimony on canal value in Indianapolis Water
Case in lower court 272 U. S. Record 90, and Mr. Carter's, id. 131
market value of lands outside terminals, Minnesota Rate Case, (1912)
230 U. S. 352, 445-456, 38 Sup. Ct. 729, 57 L. Ed. 1511 and for the
use of this method to value land in general see note, 48 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 1196.
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is a common measurement of value, but proves useless here because large plants seldom have a market value as an operating
unit, and are almost alvays worth more than their scrap value.
2. Capitalized earning power as evidenced by market value
of stocks and securities. Although this is a useful measure of
value for some purposes, it is entirely inadequate for testing rates,
because earning power is largely determined by the rate to be set,
and thus we have a vicious circle, i.e., test the rate by a capitalization of the return from the rate to be tested. Operating on this
theory, any rate which reduced the opportunity of the company
to get its present net return would be confiscatory
Therefore
under this theory rates could be revised only to yield the present,
or a higher return. This theory, however, has crept into a
number of cases by the backhand method of evaluating intangibles
such as franchises, patents, good will, going concern value, future
earning power, etc. 35
3. Original or historic cost of the property, sometimes, in a

slightly modified form, called the "prudent investment" theory. "
In many cases this theory offers a very satisfactory solution but is
35
This measure of valuation was first introduced into the cases
by Smyth v. Ames, (1897) 169 U. S. 466-547, 18 Sup. Ct. 418, 42 L. Ed.
819, and has received at least lip service in almost every case decided
since that time. Some of the most vicious examples of this type of
reasoning are found in the following: Water rights and going concern value a pure capitalization of earning power, Indianapolis Water
Case, 272 U. S. record, 199-210, capitalized at $2,598,000 and approved by
majority opinion, (1926) 272 U. S. 400, 413, 415, 47 Sup. Ct. 144.
71 L. Ed. 316; contra and better view, United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad
Commission of Kentucky, (D.C. Ky. 1925) 13 F (2d) 510, affirmed
Jan. 2, 1929, 3 U. S. Daily 2687, 49 Sup. Ct. 150, where court refused
to allow such circuitous reasoning in setting values of gas fields and
going concern, see also Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines, (1915)
238 U S. 153, 164 if, 35 Sup. Ct. 811, 59 L. Ed. 1244; successful use
of patents capitalized, Pacific Gas Co. v. San Francisco, (1923) 265
U. S. 403, 407 44 Sup. Ct. 527 68 L. Ed. 1075. For early cases dealing
with good will see 48 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1146, note; franchise and good
will of a $60,000,000 plant set at $20,000,000, Consolidated Gas Co. v.
New York, (C.C.N.Y 1907) 157 Fed. 849, 854, later cut to $7,781,000
in Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., (1908) 212 U. S. 19, 44-48, 29
Sup. Ct. 192, 53 L. Ed. 382; and for a collection of cases showing
various views on this point see Whitten & Wilcox, Valuation of
Public
Service Corporations, ch. XXV
36
Mr. Justice Brandeis is the leading advocate of the prudent
investment theory which is fully set forth in his dissenting opinions
in the Southwestern Bell Case, (1922) 262 U. S. 276. 289, 43 Sup. Ct.
544, 67 L. Ed. 981, the Pacific Gas Co. Case, (1923) 265 U. S. 403, 416. 44
Sup. Ct. 537 68 L. Ed. 1075, and the Indianapolis Water Case, (1926)
272 U. S. 400, 421, 47 Sup. Ct. 144, 71 L. Ed. 316; and for a further discussion of this theory see Richberg, 31 Yale L. J. 263, 266, 279" Hale.
30 Yale L. J. 710, 720; Henderson, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 902, 1031 36
Quart. J. of Econ. 197, 211.
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very hard on recent investors who have bought stocks or bonds
depending upon capital appreciation, and becomes almost useless
where the company has gone through a series of receiverships or
financial reorganizations."
4. Cost of reproducing the physical plant.3 8 This cost may
be at almost any date or price level. As we shall see, it has proved
worse than useless because it offers no permanent solution of any
problem, and leads to the most absurd speculations and unnatural
costs. 39
5. Cost of the next best substitute for the present plant.
This theory often proves useful in determining the value of partly
obsolescent property, but if logically followed, it leads to absurd
conclusions."
6. The cost of reproducing (a) the identical service, (b) its
next best substitute, sometimes called the competitive theory of
valuation. This theory is very closely connected with the next
37

For an approval of historical cost see Smyth v. Ames, (1891)
169 U. S. 466, 547, 18 Sup. Ct. 418, 42 L. Ed. .819; Galveston Electric
Co. v. Galveston, (1921) 258 U. S. 388, 391, 42 Sup. Ct. 351, 66 L. Ed.
678, and opinions cited supra. This theory was disapproved directly
or by38 inference in all cases adopting the reproduction theory, cited infra.
This theory at present dominates the lower courts and sonic of
the 39
commissions. See the cases cited in note 95 below.
Some of the absurdities of this theory will appear from the
following examples: Claims for extra cost of "reproducing" mains laid
long ago but now in thickly populated districts, Indianapolis Water
Case, 272, U. S. record, 83; replacing paving over mains laid before the
paving existed, Kings County Lighting Case, (D.C. N.Y 1925) 7 F
(2d) 192, 201 Des Moines Gas Case, (1915) 238 U. S. 153, 171, 35
Sup. Ct. 811, 59 L. Ed. 1244, Pacific Gas Co. Case, (D.C. Calif. 1921),
273 Fed. 937 and see also summary of subject in Whitten & Wilcox,
Valuation of Public Service Corporations, ch. XVIII, charges for
theoretical cost of preliminary organization expenses and overhead
items for reconstruction of plant when in fact none actually existed
in original construction approved, Ohio Utilities Co. Case (1924), 267
U. S. 359, 361-363, 45 Sup. Ct. 259 69 L. Ed. 634 insisting upon the use
of reproduction cost to evaluate obsolete property such value reaching
$1,396,170.54, although the original cost was less than $200,000 and the
next best substitute would cost only $267,306, the court ruled out the
evidence of the cost of the substitute, Indianapolis Water Co. Case,
272 U. S. record, pp. 159, 335, 214, and this was approved by the
Supreme Court, (1926) 272 U. S. 400, 417-418, 47 Sup. Ct. 144, 71 L.
Ed. 316.
4OThis theory is approved and disapproved in the same passage
by the Supreme Court in the Indianapolis Water Case in the citation
in note 39 above; approved where the next best substitute would cost
more, replacing the canal; and disapproved where it would cost less,
replacing the pumping station. For an absurd use of this theory see
the Worcester Electric Light Rate Case, (June 3, 1927) Mass. D. P U.
2609 and 2694, Order 9472, record 403-416, 864, 865, where a pond
costing less than $100,000 became worth $1,200,000 when valued on this
theory- see also Brooklyn Union Gas Co. Case, (D.C. N.Y 1925) 7 F
(2d) 628, 649, where this theory is disapproved.
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best substitute theory mentioned above except that the emphasis is
on the service rather than the plant. It is useful in setting rates,
but has little bearing on the question of confiscation of property
1
except where dealing with a partly obsolete plant.,
The results obtained by any one of these theories may or not
have to be corrected by allowing for depredation. Whether or
not such corrections are allowed will depend upon the past policy
of the company in charging depreciation as part of the rates,'4
and upon the particular type of valuation theory adopted. The
item of depreciation itself looms so large in valuation, and this
problem alone is so complex, that the authorities on the subject are
43
in hopeless disagreement.
V

FEDERAL PRACTICE IN DEALING WITH VALUATION OF LOCAL
UTILITIES

The problem of evaluating the physical property is reproduced in each of the incidentals and intangibles, the theories becoming more vague and the arguments hotter as the property to
be considered varies from tangible to intangible. Thus we find
the writers on valuation wandering in disorder with their heads
in a fog of undeveloped economic theory and their feet in a
quagmire of clashing financial interests. An examination of the
results achieved by litigation will show that the courts are no
nearer than the writers to a solution of the problem.
Although the constitutionality of a rate may be questioned
on its facts by appeal to the state courts,"' the usual and more
approved method is to raise the question by enjoining the com41The so-called economic value of the canal in Indianapolis Water

Case, mentioned in (1926) 272 U. S. 400, 417, 47 Sup. CL 144, 71 L. Ed. 316,
and in the Commission order No. 6613 there cited, 272 U. S. record
209, 210, 231, is an example of this theory- see also San Diego Land
Co. v. National City, (1899) 174 U. S. 739, 757, 19 Sup. Ct. 804, 43
L. Ed. 1154.
42Different results will be obtained upon the use of the theories
set out an note 26 above.
43For examples of this disagreement among jurists see note 27
above. For further discussion of the subject see Whitten & Wilcox.
Valuation of Public Service Corporation, ch. XXXII, Glaeser, Outline of Public Utility Economics, ch. XV Dewing, Financial Policy
of Corporations (1926) 469- Bonbright, Depreciation and Valuation
for Rate Control, 27 Col. L. Rev. 113, and numerous articles there
cited.
44Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, (1919) 253 U. S.
287 40 Sup. Ct. 527 64 L. Ed. 908; see also Buchanan, The Ohio
Valley Water Company Case and the Valuation of Railroads, 40
Harv. L. Rev. 1033, and cases cited in Appendix, 1070 ff.
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mission or other regulatory officers from enforcing the rates. 8
in this proceeding, after the commission has fixed a rate, the company asks for a temporary injunction till the court can determine
whether in fact the rate violates the company's rights under the
fourteenth amendment. As we have already seen, the facts are
so involved and complicated that the court itself cannot take time
to investigate them in detail, so after a hearing before three
judges the case is turned over to a master. Although the commission has usually given the whole subject a full hearing and
considered all the facts bearing upon the valuation, the master
begins the case de novo. "Judicial process" demands that facts be
found upon evidence, so the master 40 calls in the evidence, which
always consists of volumes of books, papers, charts, and a long
list of expert witnesses who testify as to their opinion of the value
After a protracted hearing the master reports
of the property
his results to the lower court, together with a record of the
"relevant" parts of the evidence, which usually runs into volumes
of printed matter.
The court then renders an "independent opinion on the facts,"
determining whether the rate will yield a fair return on the "value"
which it finds in the opinion. As we have seen such a decision
rests purely on opinion. One great jurist 48 has described the
process as follows
"The decision involves ordinarily the making of four subsidiary ones
45 See Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion in the Ohio Valley

Water Case, (1919) 253 U. S. 287 294, 40 Sup. Ct. 527 646 L. Ed.
908, and cases there cited. For examples of this type of procedure
see cases
cited in notes 99 to 110 below.
46
The master in these cases is chosen by the court with the consent
of both parties. Thus he is always a neutral party

and this neutrality

almost always requires a lack of experience with valuation cases. So
we find the task of finding the facts placed in the hands of a lawyer
who is poorly equipped to deal with the economic and engineering
technicalities which are certain to arise in the hearing. The result
is an initial confusion of the entire matter, which is augmented as

the judicial process grinds on.

In European practice, the master in

such a case would be an expert engineer or economist; see Englemann,

History of Continental Civil Procedure, 7 Continental Legal History
Series,
361, 557-558, 563, 719, 762, 789.
47

Expert witnesses and capable counsel are very expensive.
Ont
eastern public service corporation (name withheld by request) reports

that the engineering cost alone of evaluating a $230,000,000 plant was
$1,800,000.
48
Mr. justice Brandeis' concurring opinion in the Southwestern
Bell Telephone Case, (1922) 262 U. S. 276, 291, 43 Sup. Ct. 544, 67
L. Ed. 981.
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1. What the gross earnings from operating the utility
under the rate in controversy would be. (A prediction.)
2. What the operating expenses and charges, while so
operating would be. (A predictaon.)
3. The rate-base, that is, what the amount is on which a
return should be earned. (Under Smyth v. Ames, an opinion,
largely.)
4. What rate of return should be deemed fair. (An opinion,
largely.)
A decision that a rate is confiscatory (or compensatory) is
thus a result of four subsidiary determinations. Each of the four
involves formng a judgment, as distinguished from ascertaining
facts. And as to each factor, there is usually room for difference
in judgment."
After the lower court has rendered its judgment, the case then
goes up with its now highly augmented record, and voluminous
briefs of counsel speculating upon the plausibility of the expert
testimony and the manner in which the commission, the master
and the lower court reached their respective decisions.' 9 The
Supreme Court then repeats the process of the lower court, rendering its opimon upon the opinion of the commission, the experts,
the master and the lower court as to the adequacy of the valuation and incidentally upon the question of "fair rate of return."
VI

RESULTS ACHIEVED IN INDIANAPOLIS WATER CASE

The insuperable difficulties which the courts face in attempting thus to determine a fact of valuation are illustrated by the
record of the Indianapolis Water Co. Case.50 This company is a
comparatively small corporation capitalized at about $5,500,000,
with an authorized bond issue of $10,522,000.1 It serves 82,291
customers in a population of 397,000 people in the city of Indianapolis, Indiana. The total valuation of all its property approximates something well under twenty-five million dollars. "
Yet its history contains a series of reorganizations.53 And its
49
Any record of a valuation case will disclose a large amount of
space taken up with briefs. A few examples of the total space devoted to briefs alone follow- Consolidated Gas Co. Case, 212 U. S.,
1054 pages; Consolidated Gas Co. Case, 258 U. S., 1459 pages; Consolidated Gas Co. Case, 272 U. S., 602 pages; Brooklyn Union Gas Co.
Case, 272 U. S., 322 pages; Southwestern Bell Case, 262 U. S., 195
pages; Indianapolis Water Co. Case, 272 U. S., 274 pages; Los
Angeles & Salt Lake R. R. Case, 273 U. S., 614 pages.
50(1926) 272 U. S. 400, 47 Sup. Ct. 144, 71 L. Ed. 316.
51
These figures include $4,500,000 of stock dividends and $3,000,000
of bond
dividends; see 272 U. S. record, p. 149.
2
5 See opinion of lower court, 272 U. S. record, 63.
53See 272 U. S. record, 209.
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present corporate structure is complicated by the existence of an
operating, and one or more holding companies,54 which are so
common in the field of public utility financing. 5
The case in question arose in the usual manner upon a bill
in equity filed by the water company in December, 1923, in the
United States district court, to enjoin the enforcement of new
water rates set by the Public Service Commission of Indiana.
The proceedings to fix these rates had begun six months earlier,
and the commission, after extensive hearings participated in by
the company, the city, and civic bodies, had fixed the rate in question.56 The new rates, representing an increase over the ones
then in force, were determined on the basis of a complete new
evaluation calculated upon all the evidence that later came before
the court.
The company was comparatively small. The court, dispensing with the services of a master, heard the evidence itself.
The commission, the lower court, and the majority of the Supreme
Court, were agreed that the theory of reproduction was to be taken
as the determining factor of value,57 and that 7 per cent was a
reasonable rate of return on the value so determined. 8 Within
seven months of the beginning of these proceedings before the
commission, the company and commission, after a complete investigation by the commission's engineers, had agreed upon a valuation
of the entire property involved, for bond issue purposes. This
result supported in detail the valuation for rate making purposes
later made by the commission and questioned in this suit.55 All
54
For these, and further details of financial structure see Moody s
Manual
55 of Investments, Public Utilities (1927) 271-272.
For the extent to which the electric power industry is being
consolidated and becoming an interstate rather than a local problem
see Federal Trade Commission's Report on Electric Power Industry
Senate
Document No. 213, (1927) U. S. Daily 228, 229, 4374.
5
57GSee the company's Bill of Complaint, Record, p. 1-8.
See commission's opinion, 272 U. S. record, p. 25-28, District
Judge Geiger's opinion and explanatory letters, 272 U. S. record, p.
57-60; majority opinion of Supreme Court, (1926) 272 U. S. 400, 408
ff., 47 Sup. Ct. 144, 71 L. Ed. 316; but see Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissenting
opinion, id. 421 ff.
58
See id. record, p. 9, District Judge Geiger's opinion, id. record,
pp. 57 64 Supreme Court, majority opinion, (1926) 272 U. S. 400, 420,
47 Sup. Ct. 144, 71 L. Ed. 316; but see Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissenting
opinion at page 425.
59The earlier valuation for bond issue purposes was $16,455,000
(Record, 242), while the valuation questioned in this suit was $15,264,000. There is an apparent discrepancy of $1,191,000 between the
two findings which causes the court (Record, 61-63) to hold the sec
ond clearly unreasonable. But this difference is clearly explained

in both the earlier findings of the commission (Record, 238) and the
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these facts tended to simplify the case. There was no necessity
of projecting return or calculating fictitious costs of production.
The only point at issue was the value of the property on the reproduction theory. Thus we have here an example of a valuation
case reduced to its simplest possible element, the determination of
the pure fact of value by agreed methods.
If ever the judicial solution of the rate making problem is to
succeed, this case offered the opportunity Yet what were the
practical results obtained?
An examination of the record 0 and opinions discloses that
over forty different estimates of the total value of the property
were offered in evidence before the commission and the courts.
These estimates ranged from $8,612,399, the actual cost of the
property shown by the company's books, to $25,404,026, the value
claimed by Mr. Hagenah, an expert witness for the company.
On the basis of this testimony the commission split. In a three
to two decision the majority8 ' set the value as not less than
$15,260,400, while the mmority62 put it at $12,000,000. The
company, although it claimed as high as $25,000,000, offered in
court to accept $19,000,000 as a minimum. The lower court,
after floundering hopelessly in the mass of "evidence" accepted
the company's figures as a minimum and enjoined enforcement
of the rate because it would yield less than five per cent return
on that figure.6" On appeal the United States Supreme Court,
with Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Stone vigorously dissenting, talked about items to be considered, reproduction at spot
prices as the determining factor, and various theories of intangible
valuation. Then it took the bit in its teeth and set the valuation at
not less than the company's price, $19,000,000.
The proceedings in this, the simplest of cases as rate fixng
cases go, started on June 8, 1923, and three years and five months
later, on November 22, 1926, the Supreme Court finally reversed
the comnission. The investigation to compile the evidence and
later opinion (Record, 17, 23, and 25) by the fact that the first valuation for bond issue purposes contained over a million dollars' worth
of real estate and canal land owned by the company not used or

useful in public service, which was properly left out of consideration
m fixang
value for rate making purposes.
60
1See 272 U. S. record, 24, 25, 74, 91, 149, 353, 362.
6 Commissioners Ratts, McCardle and Douglas, opinion, 272 U. S.
record,
62 pp. 10-34, 29.
Commissioners Wampler and Artman, opinion, 272 U. S. rec-

ord, 6345-367 366.

3See lower court's decision, 272 U. S. record, 64.
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the hearing of the testimony in the various tribunals consumed
over a year's effort by a combined staff of experts employed by
the commission and the company
The briefs and record, in
greatly abbreviated form, in the Supreme Court alone had reached
a total of about 700 pages which fill a bound volume approximately three inches thick, when the court, to avoid further delay,
fixed the valuation.
What has been the result of all this effort? It must be admitted that valuation at its best is a complicated problem, and
considerable effort is necessary to solve the difficulties involved
therein. But as a practical matter, has this case aided materially
in setting the conflict of interests in Indianapolis or brought any
closer the final determination of a water rate? The opinion of
the majority, which must be taken to be the result of the cases,
gives a striking answer to these questions. One tangible result
at least is achieved, quoting Mr. Justice Butler, "On consideration
of the evidence, it is held that the value of the property as of
January 1, 1924 and immediately following was not less than
$19,000,000."64 But how does the court reach the result? The
opinion also gives the approved formula. It tells us that present
value is present value and is to be found as follows
"If the tendency of prices is not definitely upward or downward and it does not appear probable that there will be a substantial change of prices, then the present value of the lands
(sales price for next best use) plus the present cost of construct-

ing the plant, less depreciation, if any is a fair measure of value
of the physical elements of the property The validity of the rates
in question depends upon the value January 1, 1924, and for a
reasonable time following."65
Thus it is clear that the Supreme Court approved of the methods
used by the lower court of reconstructing the plant in its present
condition at spot prices. It also agreed with the lower court in
disapproving the commission's use of average prices prevailing
over a ten-year period up till two years before the present stit
It also disapproved by inference the use of prices or value prevailing two years before the investigation.
Now suppose the commission on the day the Supreme Court
handed down that decision had fixed rates calculated to yield 7
64
Last sentence of the opinion, (1926) 272 U. S. 400, 421, 47 Sup.
Ct. 144,
71 L. Ed. 316. The italics are the author's.
65
McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., (1926) 272 U S. 400, 411,
47 Sup. Ct. 144, 71 L. Ed. 316. The parentheses and italics are the
author's. It is interesting to note that the inquiry began six months
before the date of the final valuation.
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per cent on $19,000,000, would the rate stand without a redetermination of the value of the plant? The plain answer on the
theory of the case must be, No I The valuation is fixed as of
January, 1924. The rate necessarily must be fixed as of November, 1926.66 The company, if it desired, could question the rates
immediately, and the inquiry would have to take place in 1927
The words of the court clearly demand this
"It must be determined whether the rates complained of are
yielding and will yield
a reasonable rate of return on the
value of the property at the time of the investigaton and for a
reasonable time %nthe immediate fitture."67
The only "fact" of value conclusively established is "spot" value
as of 1924, but the spot has moved while the judicial process
ground on. The system approved in this case demands a new
determination of value, so the commission, courts, and experts
must get together once more and construct a new theoretical plant
on the "spot" prices of 1927 The very magnitude of the task
will again cause the result to be useless. Thus, on the theory of
this case, no rate can ever be set which will bind the company
But surely this cannot be the actual result. After all, courts
and commissions are practical people, surely the cases do not work
out this way in real life. Let us examine other cases where a
similar theory was followed, in an attempt to set rates over a
period of years.
VII

FAILURE OF THE GAS RATE VALUATIONS

FOR NEW

YORK CITY
The history of the legislative, administrative and judicial attempts to establish a gas rate for the companies serving greater
New York City illustrates that the objections to the theory of the
Indianapolis Water Case are very practical.
This controversy, in so far as it affects our present problem,
began in 1905, when the legislature appointed a committee to investigate the rates charged by the gas companies serving the metropolis. After the usual hearings, the committee reported,"S
among other facts, that the present metropolitan district was served
66
Retroactive rates would be clearly illegal, Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., (1921) 258 U. S. 165, 177 42 Sup. Ct. 264, 66 L. Ed. 538.
67(1926) 272 U. S. 400, 409, 47 Sup. Ct. 144, 71 L. Ed. 316. Italics
are author's.
(Ed.)
6
sReport of the joint Committee of the Senate and Assembly of
the State of New York, April 29, 1905, Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co.,
212 U. S. record, pp. 66-135.
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by the following companies The Consolidated Gas Company,
with its seven subsidiary companies,6 9 The Bronx Gas and Electric Company, and The Brooklyn Union Gas Company, with its
five subsidiary companies. 70 The report contained complete figures as to valuation of the properties and recommended that the
rates, then approximately one dollar per unit, be reduced to
seventy-five cents. 71 The legislature, acting upon this recommendation, limited the price of gas sold to the city to seventy-five
cents, 72 and empowered the commission to set the rates to private
consumers at eighty cents. 73 The commission accordingly set this
rate in February 1906, and the companies immediately appealed
to the courts. The cases dealing with the problem as it affected
the Consolidated Gas Company are sufficient illustration of the
trend to the entire litigation in the federal courts
On February 22, 1906, the company applied to the United
States circuit court for the southern district of New York, and
later obtained, a preliminarv injunction against the enforcement
of the new rates, impounding the difference between eighty cents
and one dollar till final disposition of the case. 74 After a master
had heard evidence for a year, he submitted a five-volume report
evaluating the property at $83,357,000, and holding the rates confiscatory The court cut the value to $59,000,000, but made the
injunction permanent. 75 ALfter appeal the United States Supreme
Court, on January 4, 1909, reversed the lower court because the
company had "failed to sustain the burden cast upon it of showing beyond any just and fair doubt that the acts of the legislature
of the state of New York were in fact confiscatory "70 The
excess of rates collected in the interim were to be returned to
69
The New York Mutual Gas Light Company, The Standard Gas
Light Company, New Amsterdam Gas Company, East River Gas
Company of Long Island City Central Union Gas Company, Northern
Union Gas Company and Westchester Lighting Company, see report
supra,
70 note 68 page 67 117
The Woodhaven Gas Light Company, The Flatbush Gas Company, The Newton Gas Company, The Richmond Hill and Queens
County Gas Light Company, and the Jamaica Gas Light Company see
report supra note 68, page 117
71See report supra note 68, page 134.
72N. Y Laws 1905, ch. 736.
73N. Y Laws 1905, ch. 737
74 Consolidated Gas Company v. Meyer et al., (C.C. N.Y 1906)
146 Fed.
150.
75Consolidated Gas Company v. City of New York, (C.C. N.Y
1907) 157 Fed. 849, 854, 879
76Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Company, (1908) 212 U. S. 19 54,
29 Sup. Ct. 192, 53 L. Ed. 401.
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the public, and the company was given the opportunity to open
the case again if the rates actually collected did prove insufficient.
The eighty-cent rate evidently yielded a satisfactory return,
for it was not challenged again in the federal courts until January, 1919. At that time the company again sought an injunction.
The case was once more referred to a master, and a year and a
half later he reported on the value. The evidence consisted of
over 15,000 printed pages of testimony and exhibits, and there
were one hundred exceptions to the master's findings. The company claimed a valuation of $150,000,000. The master set it at
$75,000,000, the court put it at $71,977,533, but granted the injunction. 77 The decree granting the injunction set the rates to
be charged at a dollar and twenty cents and impounded the excess above eighty cents until final disposition of the case. On
appeal, the Supreme Court, March 6, 1922, affirmed the lower
court but released the impounded receipts and removed the restnctions on rates set by the court.7 1 The record in this case in
the Supreme Court alone contained twenty thousand printed pages
and filled 21 volumes.7 9 The lower court allowed a master's
fee of $118,000, which was cut by the Supreme Court to $49,250.80
This left the company entirely without regulation as to rates,
which soon rose to as high as one dollar and fifty cents per unit.
On August 30, 1922, the company and commission agreed upon
a dollar and fifteen cents,"' which stood until June, 1923, when
the legislature set the rate at one dollar.8 "
Again the compames applied for an injunction. Once more,
after the company had taken a year to prepare it, a master heard
the evidence, and submitted his voluminous report. As usual
the court affirmed the master, enjoined enforcement of the rate,
and impounded the excess under bond.8s Finally, in November,
1926, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court,8 ' and the
77Consolidated Gas Co. of New York v. Newton, (D.C. N.Y 1920)
231, 240, 268.
267 Fed.
78
Newton v. Consolidated
177 742 Sup. Ct. 264, 66 L. Ed.
9Newton v. Consolidated
264, 66 L. Ed. 538.
Sup. Ct.
s 0Newton v. Consolidated
Ct. 438, 66 L. Ed. 844.

Gas Company, (1921) 258 U. S. 165,
538.
Gas Co., (1921) 258 U. S. 165, 174, 42
Gas Co., (1921)

259 U. S. 101, 42 Sup.

8s-Public Service Commission (New York) 1922, 187

82N. Y. Laws 1923, ch. 899.
s3Consolidated Gas Co. of New York v. Prendergast, (D.C. N.Y
1925) 6 F (2d) 243; see also final decree as set out ii the record of
Ottinger v. Consolidated Gas Co., 272 U. S. record, pp. 322, 325.
84Ottinger v. Consolidated Gas Co., (1926) 272 U. S. 576, 47 Sup.
Ct. 198, 71 L. Ed. 420.
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company was returned to the makeshift rate fixed by agreement
with the commission in 1922.
Briefly summarized, the result of all this litigation has been
about as follows
It has now been twenty-two years since the commission attempted to put the first rates into effect.
During this time there have been only ten years of normal
collecting of rates, and twelve years of continuous litigation.8"
The companies were practically without regulation and free
to set their own rates for seven years."6
Part of the proceeds of the rates were held under bond for
redistribution pending the result of litigation for nine years.
Refunds of twenty cents for every thousand cubic feet of
gas consumed over a period of three years were supposed to have
been made to all customers.
The printed records in the United States Supreme Court covering these eight cases, 7 which contain only a fraction of the
evidence and are abbreviated as much as possible, 8 fill over
These volumes are larger than the
forty-five huge volumes.
complete output of the highest courts of each of fourteen states,
the District of Columbia, and all of the territories under the
jurisdiction of the federal courts.a
85This does not take into account the investigation by legislative
committees and cases before the commission. For an indication of
the number and complexity of these cases see I Public Service Commission
(New York), 187-196.
86
But see Morrell v. Brooklyn Borough Gas Co., (1921) 231 N. Y
N. E. 129, holding commission may approve rates.
398, 8132
7
Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., (1908)

212 U. S. 19, 29 Sup.

Ct. 192, 53 L. Ed. 382; Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., (1921) 258
U. S. 165, 42 Sup. Ct. 264, 66 L. Ed. 538, Newton v. Kings County
Lighting Co., (1921) 258 U. S. 180, 42 Sup. Ct. 268, 66 L. Ed. 550;
Newton v. New York & Queens Gas Co., (1921) 258 U. S. 178, 42
Sup. Ct. 268, 66 L. Ed. 549" Newton v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co,
(1921) 258 U. S. 604, 42 Sup. Ct. 313, 66 L. Ed. 786; Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., (1921) 259 U. S. 101, 42 Sup. Ct. 438, 66 L. Ed.
844, Ottinger v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., (1926) 272 U. S. 579, 47
Sup. Ct. 199, 71 L. Ed. 421 Ottinger v. Consolidated Gas Co., (1926)
272 U.
S. 576, 47 Sup. Ct. 198, 71 L. Ed. 420.
s8 See Equity Rules 75 and 76 together with the court's remarks
in Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., (1921) 258 U. S. 165, 173-174, 42
Sup. Ct. 264, 66 L. Ed. 538, where the court reprimands counsel for
including too much material in the record. But in spite of this
warning which reduces the evidence to the minimum, the voluminous
continued to appear in the cases which followed.
records
89Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah,
Vermont, Wyoming, Alaska, Hawaii, Porto Rico, Philippine Islands
and District of Columbia.
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This mass of evidence, in whole or in part, passed through the
hands of one or more legislative committees, seven different
masters and six federal courts. There are at least twenty-three
reported decisions,90 covering a total of about 319 pages, 1 dealing
almost entirely with questions of fact, but the valuation of the
companies' property is no nearer final determination than it was
twenty-two years ago.
During this entire period the companies have not had rates
imposed upon them against their consent.9 2
This experience of the state of New York with its gas
companies has been set forth in full not because it is unique, but
because it typifies similar unsuccessful attempts by municipalities
and state governments to regulate the rates of their own public
utilities. Almost any city in the United States with privately
owned utility plants has its counterpart of this never-ending
struggle."
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Consolidated Gas Co. Cases: (C.C. N.Y 1906) 146 Fed. 150;
(C.C. N.Y. 1907) 157 Fed. 849- (1908) 212 U. S. 19, 29 Sup. Ct. 192.
53 L. Ed. 382; (D.C. N.Y. 1919) 256 Fed. 238; (D.C. N.Y 1919) 260
Fed. 244; id. 1022; (1919) 253 U. S. 219, 40 Sup. Ct. 511, 64 L. Ed.
870; (D.C. N.Y. 1920) 267 Fed. 231, (D.C. N.Y. 1921) 274 Fed. 986;
(1921) 258 U. S. 165, 42 Sup. Ct. 264, 66 L. Ed. 538; (1921) 259 U. S.
101, 42 Sup. Ct. 438, 66 L. Ed. 844; (D.C. N.Y. 1925) 6 F (2d) 243:
(1926) 272 U. S. 576, 47 Sup. Ct. 198, 71 L. Ed. 420; New York and
Queens Gas Co. Cases: (D.C. N.Y. 1920) 269 Fed. 277 (1921) 258 U. S.
178, 42 Sup. Ct. 268, 66 L. Ed. 549- Kings County Gas Co. Cases:
(D.C. N.Y. 1920) 268 Fed. 143; (1921) 258 U. S. 180, 42 Sup. Ct.
268, 66 L. Ed. 550; (D.C. N.Y. 1925) 7 F (2d) 192; Brooklyn Union
Gas Co. Cases: (D.C. N.Y. 1920) 269 Fed. 452; (1921) 258 U. S. 604, 42
Sup. Ct 313, 66 L. Ed. 786; (D.C. N.Y. 1925) 7 F (2d) 628; (1926)
272 U.
S. 579, 47 Sup. Ct. 199, 71 L. Ed. 420.
91
These opinions are no longer than the average and are occupied
chiefly with the discussion of facts, which shows conclusively that
the points
of law involved in these cases are of no consequence.
92
Although the company lost the first appeal to the Supreme
Court in 212 U. S. 19, 29 Sup. Ct. 192, 53 L. Ed. 382, it was given the
opportunity to reopen the case at once if the rates did not prove
compensatory. The fact that the company waited for nine years
before availing itself of this privilege, although prices were steadily
rising,
93 is an indication that the rates yielded a satisfactory return.
The Lincoln Gas Company of Lincoln, Nebraska, kept a city
ordinance suspended by litigation for thirteen straight years (19061919), and the case after being in the Supreme Court five times was
still unsettled at the end of that period. See Lincoln Gas Co. Cases.
(1911) 223 U. S. 349, 32 Sup. Ct. 271, 56 L. Ed. 466: (1919) 250 U. S.
256, 39 Sup. Ct. 454, 63 L. Ed. 968; (1919) 253 U. S. 477 40 Sup.
Ct. 585, 64 L. Ed. 1022; (1920) 256 U. S. 512, 41 Sup. Ct. 558, 65
L. Ed. 1066; (1921) 257 U. S. 6, 42 Sup. Ct. 2, 66 L. Ed. 101. Although the company finally lost the first suit it immediately opened
another due to changed price levels, see id. (1921) 257 U. S. 6, 8, 42
Sup. Ct. 2, 66 L. Ed. 101. Kansas City had a similar experience, see
Landon v. Public Utilities Commission, etc., (D.C. Kai. 1916) 234
Fed. 152; (D.C. Kans. 1917) 242 Fed. 658; (D.C. Kans. 1917) 245
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VIII

RESULTS MEASURED BY ENDS TO BE ACHIEVED IN
RATE REGULATION

What is the result of all this effort and expense when measured in terms of the interests involved and the ends to be
achieved in rate regulation?
The present methods of procedure by courts and commissions
offer the companies little freedom of action and no stabilized
basis upon which to construct a sound industrial development.
The companies are forced to spend millions of dollars and the
best efforts of their experts in the needless speculation as to
values of property 94 The constant litigation, with its impounding of rates, is an annoyance that detracts from the constructive
efforts of executives. The income at its best depends upon a
gambler's chance that the court will accept one expert's opinion
rather than another's. If the reproduction theory of setting value
9
as a basis of rates, which seems to dominate at present, is continued in a period of falling prices, it will ruin the market of
9
utility securities and result in the bankruptcy of many companies.
The customer on the other hand is subject to all sorts of
annoyances, the constant changes of rates by injunctions, the
retroactive effect of Supreme Court decisions coming years after
the litigation starts, uncertain business conditions following the
unforeseeable variations in rates, and the loss of large sums of
Fed. 950; (1918) 249 U. S. 236, 39 Sup. Ct. 268, 63 L. Ed. 577 (D.C.
Kans. 1920) 269 Fed. 411 id. 423, id. 433. The street railway fights
of Boston, New York, Chicago, and the New Jersey shore have added
their bit to the general confusion, see cases cited in note 97 below, and
other less striking but equally serious situations in all parts of the
country see cases cited in notes 105 and 106 below.
04See note 47 above.
95Reproduction cost is the dominant element in determining value,
see, New York Telephone Co. v. Prendergast, (D.C. N.Y 1924) 300
Fed. 822; Van Wert Gas Light Co. v. Public Utilities Commission,
(D.C. Ohio, 1924) 299 Fed. 670, 673, Monroe Gas Light and Fuel Co.
v. Michigan Public Utilities Commission, (D.C. Mich. 1923) 292 Fed.
139- Consolidated Gas Co. v. Prendergast, (D.C. N.Y 1925) 6 F
(2d) 243, 280; Bluefields Water Works v. Public Service Commission,
(1922) 262 U. S. 679, 43 Sup. Ct. 675, 67 L. Ed. 1176; Missouri ex rel.
Southwestern Bell Co. v. Public Service Commission, (1922) 262
U. S. 276, 43 Sup. Ct. 544, 67 L. Ed. 981 McCardle v. Indianapolis
Water Co., (1926) 272 U. S. 400, 47 Sup. Ct. 144, 71 L. Ed. 316; but
see the dissenting opinions cited in note 36 above.
90Owing to the many factors involved it is impossible to trace
the effect of any one decision upon the price of stocks and bonds.
It is fair to say however, that over a long period of time regulation
has forced down railroad securities; but as yet it has shown no effect
in the market for local utility securities, which are now at a premium
on all markets.
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money due to the impossibility of refunding overcharges on
impounded rates subsequently declared illegal. The impracticability of these refund measures and the inconveniences which they
cause, is best illustrated by the Chicago, New York, and New
Jersey traction cases where the courts devised injunctions requiring the companies to issue to millions of passengers daily,
one and two cent refund slips, the majority of -which would be
lost long before the cases were settled. 7 In addition to these
difficulties, the emphasis on reconstruction value as a rate base
tends to block improvement in the service. It encourages the
companies in using antiquated machinery and obsolete equipment
because of the increase of rates which will result from the practice
of including such machinery in the valuation at prices many times
greater than its original cost or present value as productive equipment. Thus, in a recent case an obsolete pumping plant that
cost less than two hundred thousand and could have been replaced
with modern machinery for less than three hundred thousand, was
allowed a "reproduction" value of over one million dollars.1a
But, though the consumer is heavily burdened, the public at
large is the greatest sufferer from the present "process" of valuation. The unnecessary social friction due to the overloading of
the legal machinery, the diverting of the attention of courts from
other important matters of law to attend to purely speculative
questions of fact, the lost effort of commissions due to constant
delays and unnecessary reversals, all these are minor matters
compared with the financial cost entailed in the proper conduct
of a valuation case. Expert witnesses and capable counsel are
expensive luxuries. One eastern public service corporation reports that the engineering cost alone of evaluating a two hundred
and thirty million dollar plant was over a million and three quarters dollars. Add to this the fees of expert witnesses and a competent legal staff and it becomes apparent that no private citizen
or civic organization can, and no state governmental agency supported by taxes will, attempt to compete with the corporations
in gathering and presenting evidence before the master or the
97For this ridiculous piece of judicial rate making see, Public
Service Ry. v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, (D.C. N.Y
1921) 276 Fed. 979, 990; Chicago Rys. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission, (D.C. IlL 1922) 277 Fed. 970, 982; Interboro Rapid Transit
Co. v. Gilchrist, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1928) 26 F (2d) 912, 928: and Los
Angeles Ry. Company v. Ry. Commission of California, (D.C. Calif.
1928) 29 F (2d) 140, 147
98This was approved by the Supreme Court in the Indianapolis
Water case, see footnote 39 above and other instances there cited.
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court. The result is that the companies' cases always have the
preponderance of plausible opinion, and we may expect to find
them winning most of the valuation cases.
This expectation is amply supported by the results in the
federal courts. An examination of the cases decided since 1912,
the date of the Minnesota Rate Casel9 which first laid down the
valuation process in its present form, shows that out of sixteen
cases in the Supreme Court raising the complete fact of valtation, 10 ° the companies have succeeded in having the rates permanently enjoined in fourteen. 01 In one,' 0 ' the lower court,
9
9The Minnesota Rates Case, (1912) 230 U. S. 352. 33 Sup. Ct. 729,
57 L. Ed. 1511, and similar cases where interstate and intrastate valuation questions are raised, are omitted from this compilafion because
they turn on considerations other than valuation, for an example of
these cases see Missouri Rate Case, (1912) 230 U S. 474, 33 Sup.
Ct. 975, 57 L. Ed. 1571 Cumberland Telephone & Tel. Co. v. Louisiana
Public Service Co., (D.C. La. 1922) 283 Fed. 215 and cases there cited.
'00Those cases where the parties agreed on the basic facts of
valuation but disputed their legal application [Des Moines Gas Co.
v. Des Moines, (1914) 238 U S. 153, 35 Sup. Ct. 811, 59 L. Ed. 1244
Galveston Electric Co. v. Galveston, (1922) 258 U S. 388, 42 Sup.
Ct. 351, 66 L. Ed. 78, Brush Electric Co. v. Galveston, (1923) 262
U. S. 443, 43 Sup. Ct. 606, 67 L. Ed. 1076; and Pacific Gas & Electric
Co. v. San Francisco, (1923) 265 U. S. 403, 44 Sup. Ct. 537 68 L. Ed.
1075] and those in which the only dispute was as to the elements that
were to be used in finding the valuation [Water Co. of Tonopah v.
Public Service Com. of Nev., (D.C. Nev. 1913) 250 Fed. 304 Citizens
Gas Co. v. Public Service Com., (D.C. Mo. 1925) 8 F (2d) 632; and
United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission of Ky., (D.C. Ky.
1925) 13 F (2d) 510, affirmed, Jan. 2, 1929, 3 U S. Daily 2686, 49
Sup. Ct. 150] have been omitted because the factors are different,
but even here the companie have a marked advantage since the courts
have begun to forsake the doctrine of Smythe v. Ames and to look
for a rule for finding valuation. For the results in these earlier cases,
see note to Mr. Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion in the Southwestern Bell Telephone case, (1923) 262 U. S. 276, 296, 43 Sup. Ct.
544, 67 L. Ed. 981.
l0lSan Joaquin Co. v. Stanislaus County (1913) 233 U S. 454. 34
Sup. Ct. 652. 58 L. Ed. 1041 Denver v. Denver Union Water Co..
(1918) 246 U. S. 178, 39 Sup. Ct. 278, 62 L. Ed. 649" San Antonio
v. San Antonio Public Service Commission, (1921) 255 U S. 547 41 Sip.
Ct. 428, 65 L. Ed. 777 Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., (1922) 258 U. S.
165, 42 Sup. Ct. 264, 66 L. Ed. 538, Newton v. Kings Light Co.,
(1922) 258 U. S. 180, 42 Sup. Ct. 268. 66 L. Ed. 550; Newton v. New
York & Queens Gas Co., (1922) 258 U. S. 178, 42 Sup. Ct. 268. 66 L.
Ed. 549- Newton v Brooklyn Union Gas Co., (1922) 258 U. S. 604,
42 Sup. Ct. 313. 66 L. Ed. 786: Houston v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
(1922) 259 U. S. 318. 42 Sup. Ct. 486, 66 L. Ed. 961 Southwestern Bell
Tel. Case, (1922) 262 U. S. 276, 43 Sup. Ct. 544, 67 L. Ed. 981, Bluefields Water Works Co. v. Public Service Com.. (1922) 262 U. S. 679,
43 Sup. Ct. 675, 67 L. Ed. 1176; Ohio Public Utilities Co. v. l'ublic
Utilities Commission, (1925) 267 U. S. 359, 45 Sup. Ct. 259. 69 L. Ed.
656; McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., (1926) 272 U. S. 400. 47 Sulp.
Ct. 144. 71 L. Ed. 316; Ottinger v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co.. (1926) 272
U S. 579, 47 Sup. Ct. 199, 71 L. Ed. 421 Ottinger v. Consolidated Gas
Co., (1926) 272 U. S. 576, 47 Sup. Ct. 198, 71 L. Ed. 420.
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refusing on preliminary hearing to grant a temporary injunction,
was affirmed, and the one remaining case, which the company lost,
was the Lincohz Gas Case which was in litigation for thirteen
years.'-0
The results of similar cases in the lower federal courts
are even more striking. Of the Supreme Court cases cited above,
three are from state courts and the remaining represent seventeen
cases from federal courts all but one of which were affirmed as
decided, and this one reversal was of a decision against the company '0- In addition to these, forty-one other cases on this point
have been found in lower federal courts. Of these, the com-

panies won thirty-six.

In twenty-five, 10 5 permanent injunctions

were granted, and in eleven,'
02

the cases appear to have been

-Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Railway Commission, (1923) 262
U. S.03625, 43 Sup. Ct. 680, 67 L. Ed. 1144.
' For a history of this case see note 93 above.
10 4San Joaquin Co. v. Stanislaus County, (1913) 233 U. S. 454, 34
Sup. 05
Ct 652, 58 L. Ed. 1041.
Montana W & S. Ry. Co. v. Mosley (D.C. Mont. 1912) 198
Fed. 991, Garden City v. Garden City Tel. Light & Mfg. Co.,
(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1916) 236 Fed. 693; Spring Valley Water Co. v.
City of San Francisco, (D.C. Calif. 1918) 252 Fed. 979- Houston
Electric Co. v. City of Houston, (D.C. Tex., 1920) 265 Fed. 360;
Kings County Lighting Co. v. Nixon, (D.C. N.Y 1920) 268 Fed. 143;
Landon v. Court of Industral Relations, (D.C. Kans. 1920) 269 Fed.
411, Landon v. Court of Industrial Relations, (D.C. Kans. 1920) 269
Fed. 433; City of Winona, Wisconsin v. Minneapolis Light & Power
Co., (D.C. Minn. 1921) 276 Fed. 996; Alton Water Co. v. Commerce
Commission et al. (D.C. Ill. 1922) 179 Fed. 869- City of Minneapolis
v. Rand, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1923) 285 Fed. 818, Mobile Gas Co. v. Patterson et al., (D.C. Ala. 1923) 293 Fed. 208; Streator Aqueduct Co. v.
Smith, (D.C. Ill. 1923) 295 Fed. 385; Colorado Power Co. v. Holderman, (D.C. Col. 1924) 295 Fed. 178; Swan v. Public Utilities Commission, (D.C. Kans. 1922) 298 Fed. 114; Chesapeake & Potonmac Tel.
Co. v. Public Service Com., (D.C. Md. 1925) 3 F (2d) 938, Southwestern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Ry. Com. of S. C., (D.C. S.C. 1925)
5 F (2d) 77- Citizens Gas Co. v. Public Service Coni., (D.C. Mo.
1925) 8 F (2d) 632; Springfield Gas & Electric Co. v. Pub. Serv. Com.
of Missouri, (D.C. Mo. 1925) 10 F (2d) 252; N. Y Richmond Gas
Co. v. Prendergast, (D.C. N.Y. 1925) 10 F (2d) 167 Middlesex
Water Co. v. Public Utility Com., (D.C. N.J. 1926) 10 F (2d) 519Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Whitcomb, (D.C. Wash. 1926) 12 F (2d)
279- Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Whitcomb, (D.C. Wash. 1926) 12 F
(2d) 279- Brooklyn Borough Gas Co. v. Prendergast, (D.C. N.Y. 1926)
16 F (2d) 615; Public Utilities Commission of D. C. v. Capital Traction
Co., (C.A. D.C. 1927) 17 F (2d) 673; and Idaho Power Co. v. Thompson
(D.C.0 Idaho 1927) 19 F (2d) 547
' 6Bombright v. Geary, (D.C. Ariz. 1913) 210 Fed. 44, Springfield
Gas & Electric Co. v. Barker, Atty. Gen., (D.C. Mo. 1915) 231 Fed.
331, Kansas City C. C. & St. Ry. v. Barker, Atty. Gen., (D.C. Mo. 1915)
242 Fed. 310; Public Service Ry. v. Board of Pub. Utility Com., (D.C.
N.J. 1921) 276 Fed. 979; Chicago Rys. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Com.,
(D.C. IIl. 1922) 277 Fed. 970; Monroe Gas Light & Fuel Co. v. Micligan Pub. Utility Com., (D.C. Mich. 1923) 292 Fed. 139- Ohio Bell
Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Com., (D.C. Ohio 1924) 3 F (2d) 701
Ashland Water Co. v. Railroad Com. of Washington, (D.C. Wis.
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dropped by the public after the companies won temporary injunctions, or appeals are still pending. In the remaining five, the
companies failed to receive permanent injunctions in two,101
apparently dropped one case on the refusal of the temporary
injunction,'
and the remaining two cases,1 0' where preliminary
injunctions were refused, are still in litigation pending the finding
of facts by the master. Briefly summarized the results are as
follows the companies have won eighty-seven per cent of all
cases involving the fact of value, and out of a total of sixty-four
cases"' they have lost only two which they pursued to the end
of their legal remedies. In one of these they substantially gained
their ends by keeping the rate suspended by litigation for thirteen
years. Out of this whole welter of cases, then, we find only one
where the rate set by the commission was allowed to stand as
originally fixed without interference.
However, the mere fact that the companies win about all
their cases can not present a conclusive argument against the
justice of the system. It may be possible, but not highly probable,
that on the merits the companies are entitled to gain their ends in
over eighty-five per cent of the cases in which they differ with the
commissions on the fact of value. The mere fact that the companies win can make little difference to the general public. But
this is by no means the end of the story judicial reasoning has
allowed the major portion of the companies' costs in fighting all
their expensive cases to be passed on to the consumers under the
Thus the public is not only
guise of operating expenses."'
forced directly to pay its portion of the expenses incurred by
the state in needless effort in the courts, but must also pay indi1925) 7 F (2d) 924- Monroe Gas Light & Fuel Co. v. Public Util.
Com., (D.C. Mich. 1926) 11 F (2d) 319- Columbus Gas & Fuel Co. v.
City of Columbus, (D.C. Ohio 1927) 17 F (2d) 630; and Interboro
Rapid0 Transit Co. v. Gilchrist, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1928) 26 F (2d) 912.
1 7Reno Power, Light & Water Co. v. Pub. Serv. Com. of Nevada,
(D.C. Nev. 1923) 298 Fed. 790; Columbus Gas & Fuel Co. v. City of
Columbus, (D.C. Ohio 1927) 17 F (2d) 630.
lOSGoldfield Consolidated Water Co. v. Public Service Com., (D.C.
Nev. 1916) 236 Fed. 979.
losUnited Fuel & Light Co. v. Public Service Com., (D.C. W Va.
1926) 14 F (2d) 209- and Cambridge Electric Light Co. v. Atwell.
(D.C. Mass. 1928) 25 F (2d) 485.
lOThis number is not the result of an exhaustive search, but it
is believed that most of the cases involving the fact of value have been
found. For other related cases see notes 99 and 100 above.
"'See Consolidated Gas Co. v. Newton, (D.C. N.Y 1920) 267 Fed.
231, 254 New York & Queens Gas Co. v. Newton, (D.C. N.Y 1920)
269 Fed. 277 290; Consolidated Gas Co. v. Prendergast, (D.C. N.Y
1925) 6 F (2d) 243, 280.
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rectly in higher rates the legal expenses the company incurs in
opposing the public interest by fighting for these higher rates.1"2
If a victory for the company in a rate litigation were the
final disposal of the case the public, in the interest of certainty,
might be well content with paying the costs of both parties.
But, as we have seen, a victory for the company in these cases
merely results in a decree enjoining the enforcement of the rates.
This means that the case must be reopened and another attempt be
made to find a satisfactory rate. The significant fact, from the
social point of view, is not so much that the public service compames succeed in malng the public foot the bill to defeat itself,
but in the fact that about eighty-five per cent of all the rate cases
which get into the courts are lost effort and must be fought all
over again. The final result is a needless army of public employees, lawyers and experts chasing themselves around in a
never-ending circle. Courts are overburdened with unnecessary
facts, which they are incapable of handling; and most important
of all, since this method of valuation by judges is a process of
pyramiding upon the biased opinions of experts 13 the opinions of
courts each successively further removed from the actual facts
involved, the validity of any particular rate depends finally upon
the personal opinion of the judge who has the last say in the
matter. Thus a system theoretically based upon an argument
that judicial review of the facts is necessary "in order that there
may be a government of law and not of men," in practice defeats
the very purpose for which it was devised, and valuation of local
public utilities is falling into a hopeless morass of clashing personal opinions which can bring no lasting results, except to force
1121n the case of the eastern utility, mentioned above, which spent
a million dollars to prepare data for a valuation case, this huge
was recovered by the first ten weeks of increased rates granted
result of the hearings. (Information from private correspondence
executive of the company, name withheld by request.)
ilaThe testimony of experts in these cases is so colored by the
interests of the parties who retain them that it is more misleading
than instructive. The testimony of experts on different sides of the
case will be found to vary more than 1009 on the value of the same
object; while those of experts on the same side will vary as much as
50%. For examples of this discrepancy in testimony see the Indianapolis Water Co. Case, note 60 above, where the highest estimate was
three times as large as the lowest, and where the company's experts
claimed 33% more than the company was willing to accept as a basis
of value; the Consolidated Gas Co. Case, (D.C. N.Y 1920) 267 Fed.
231, where the company's experts claimed 1009 more than the master
found. See also notes 12 and 13 to Mr. Justice Brandeis' opinion in
the Southwestern Bell Case, (1922) 262 U. S. 276, 299, 43 Sup. Ct. 544,
67 L. Ed. 981, and examples and articles there cited.
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commissions and companies alike to turn to extra-judicial procedure to settle their disputes.
Yet in spite of this failure of the federal courts to make progress with the problem of evaluating local utilities, we now have
it argued by eminent counsel that this same method is "due process of law," must be written into the constitution, and, under
now
the fifth amendment, must be applied to the railroad valuations
14
being compiled by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
114
See Buchanan, The Ohio Valley Water Company Case and the
Valuation of Railroads, 40 Harv. L. Rev 1033, and summary of reply
brief of railroads in the O'Fallon Case, 3 U. S. Daily 2681.

